Economic growth cannot be taken for granted: Need for urgent reforms – an interview with Dr. A. Virmani Former Executive Director, International Monetary Fund and Former Chief Economic Advisor, Government of India by Singh, Charan
IIMB Management Review (2013) 25, 240e248ava i lab le a t www.sc ienced i rec t . com
ScienceDirect
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate / i imb Production and hosting by ElsevierINTERVIEW
Economic growth cannot be taken for granted:
Need for urgent reforms e an interview with
Dr. A. Virmani
Former Executive Director, International Monetary Fund
and Former Chief Economic Advisor, Government of IndiaCharan Singh*Economics and Social Sciences Area, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, Room No 003, Block C,
Bannerghatta Road, Bangalore 560076, IndiaKEYWORDS
Growth;
Inflation;
Current account deficit;
Savings;
Investment;
Subsidies;
Reforms;
Diplomatic relations;
IMF quota* Tel.: þ91 80 26993818 (office), 91 9
E-mail address: charansingh@iimb.ern
URL: http://www.iimb.ernet.in/user/
Peer-review under responsibility of Ind
Bangalore
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.201Abstract Growth of the Indian economy has suffered in the recent years as indicated by
decline in industrial production, capital formation, exports, etc. Weakening of aggregate de-
mand and decline in investment could be some of the contributing factors for this phenomenon.
While the slowdown can also be attributed to global slowdown, a high current account deficit and
gross fiscal deficit, and continuance of a high rate of inflation are some of themost worrying signs
for the policy makers. Restoration of fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic balance through
stepped-up reforms are some of the key issues that need urgent focus of the government.Dr. Arvind Virmani is a Non-resident Fellow, Brookings
Institute, Washington DC. Earlier, he was Executive
Director at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
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ment of India. He has been an advisor to the Indian
Government at the highest levels for about 25 years,
including as CEA, Ministry of Finance, and Principal
Advisor, Planning Commission.
He has served as Member, Telecom Regulatory Au-
thority of India (TRAI) and the Appellate Tribunal for
73 999 3619 (mobile).
et.in
193/charan-singh
ian Institute of Management
3.07.006
the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act;
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[LIC, PNB, Allahabad Bank, and UTI (Trustee)].
He has also directed the Indian Council for Research on
International Economic Relations (ICRIER) as its Chief
Executive and was Affiliate Professor, George Mason
University (and Distinguished Senior Fellow, School of
Public Policy e Center for Emerging Market Policies
CEMP, GMU). He has published 33 journal articles and
20 book chapters in the areas of macroeconomics,
growth and finance, international trade & tariffs, and
international relations. His books include, “The
Sudoku of India’s Growth” (BS Books, 2009), “From
Uni-polar to Tri polar World: Multi-polar Transition
Paradox” (Academic Foundation, 2009), “Propelling
India from Socialist Stagnation to Global Power “
(2006), “Accelerating Growth and Poverty Reduction e
A Policy Framework for India’s Development” (2004).
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Dr. Arvind Virmani visited the Indian Institute of Man-
agement Bangalore on the 19th and 20th of February
2013. He had just returned from the IMF in November
2012 after completing a three year tenure, where one,
amongst his many contributions, was battling for a
higher quota for India. Prior to his assignment at the IMF,
Dr. Virmani was the Chief Economic Advisor, Ministry ofTable 1 Select indicators of the Indian economy.
Units 2006e07
GDP and related indicators
Growth rate Percent 9.6
Savings rate % of GDP 34.6
Capital formation (rate) % of GDP 35.7
Production
Index of industrial production % change 12.9
Electricity generation % change 7.3
Prices
Inflation (WPI) (average) % change 6.6
Inflation CPI (IW) (average) % change 6.7
External sector
Export growth (US$) % change 22.6
Import growth (US$) % change 24.5
Current account balance to GDP Percent 1.0
Foreign exchange reserves US$ bn 199.2
Money and credit
Scheduled commercial bank credit % change 28.1
Fiscal indicators (centre)
Gross fiscal deficit % of GDP 3.3
a AprileDecember 2012.
b 2012e13 (AprileJanuary); WPI e wholesale price index; CPI (IW) e
c AprileSeptember. 2012.
d At end January, 2013.
e (Up to December 28, 2012).
f Provisional actuals.
Source: Reserve Bank of India and Government of India.Finance, Government of India (GoI). The interview was
conducted keeping in view this recent assignment of Dr.
Virmani. The following note presents the context of the
prevalent economic situation as in February 2013.
The performance of the Indian economy has suffered in
recent years. The rate of growth of the Indian economy has
been on a downtrend over the last two years. India’s growth
rate has been declining after the country recorded a high
growth of 9.6% in 2006e07 and 9.3% in 2007e08 and
2010e11. The economy has been slowing down as reflected
in industrial production, capital formation, and exports.
The slowdown can be attributed to global slowdown and a
weak monsoon. As growth slowed, government revenues
did not keep pace with spending and with declining gov-
ernment and private sector savings, the balance of pay-
ments came under pressure. Consequently, some of the
most disturbing signs of the slowdown are high current
account deficit (CAD), gross fiscal deficit (GFD) and persis-
tence in high rate of inflation (Table 1).
There is a trade-off between inflation and growth in India.
While growth rates declined, inflation rates increased sharply
in 2008,mainly because of the global commodity price boom.
Food inflation was further affected by poor monsoons. The
inflation rate had come down from the peak of above 10%
from March 2010 to July 2011 to persist at 7%e7.5% in recent
months. Food inflation, however, continued to be high and
the rising level of food inflation widened the gap between
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) and Consumer Price Index (CPI).
As per the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) (2012), close vigil on
inflation was necessary during 2012e13 to prevent re-
emergence of inflationary pressures. The RBI was raising2009e10 2010e11 2011e12 2012e13
8.6 9.3 6.2 5.0
33.7 34.0 30.8 na
36.5 36.8 35.0 na
5.3 8.2 2.9 0.7a
6.6 5.5 8.1 4.6a
3.8 9.6 8.9 7.6b
12.4 10.4 8.4 10.0b
3.5 40.5 21.3 4.9b
5.0 28.2 32.3 0.0b
2.8 2.8 4.2 4.6c
279.1 304.8 294.4 295.5d
16.9 21.5 15.9 15.1e
6.5 4.8 5.7f 5.1
Consumer Price Index-Industrial Workers.
Table 2 Growth rates in major emerging markets (percentages).
Country 2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 P
Brazil 5.7 6.1 5.2 0.3 7.5 2.7 1.0 3.5
China 10.1 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.8 8.2
India 7.6 10.0 6.9 5.9 10.1 7.9 4.5 5.9
Mexico 4.0 3.2 1.2 6.0 5.6 3.9 3.8 3.5
Russia 7.2 8.5 5.2 7.8 4.3 4.3 3.6 3.7
South Africa 4.6 5.5 3.6 1.5 2.9 3.5 2.3 2.8
P: Projections by the IMF.
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
242 C. Singhthe interest rates fromMarch 2010 and these hikes alongwith
policy constraints adversely impacted investments. Although
the Government of India has taken some steps since
September 2012 to tackle the situation byway of reduction in
subsidy for cooking gas and fuel and liberalising foreign direct
investment in select areas, the situation had not improved
and perhaps calls for further measures. Some of the critical
issues that require attention in India include restoration of
fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic balance.
Aggregate demand
The slowdown in the economy in the last few years could be
attributed to weakening of aggregate demand and decline in
investment growth. Growth in India is directly related to in-
vestment which was declining in 2011e12, mainly due to the
decline in the private corporate sector and not the household
sector (which recorded a rising trend). The lower investment
was attributed to high interest rates, drawdown of stocks,
lower demand for exports from rest of the world, and policy
bottlenecks such as seeking environmental permissions, land
acquisition, and so on. As per the Third Quarter Review
2012e13 by the RBI, released on January 28, 2013, aggregate
demand weakened during AprileSeptember 2012. The Re-
view mentions that reforms since September 2012 have
reduced immediate risks, but there was recognition that
there still was a long road ahead to bring about a sustainable
turnaround for the Indian economy. The demand revival
would require improvement in the investment climate aswell
as investor sentiments through sustained reforms. To revive
demand, policy and regulatory reforms would need to be
introduced and competition enhanced in the markets for
infrastructure services, land, agriculture and skills. India
requires policy, regulatory and institutional reforms.External factors
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the
commencement of the financial crisis in 2008 in the US and
to an extent in Euro area1 led to a sharp decline in1 The Eurozone, officially called the Euro area, is an economic and
monetary union of 17 European Union member states that have
adopted theeuro (V) as their commoncurrencyand sole legal tender.
The Eurozone currently consists of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.international trade around the world, gross domestic
product (GDP) in advanced economies, and growth in the
emerging markets and developing countries. With growth
projections and risks relating to the advanced economies
(US, Europe, UK) changing from quarter to quarter, the
world economy has been on a roller coaster ride since
2008.
The IMF’s update on the global economy released in
January 2013 indicated that the growth rates for 2013 in
most countries (advanced and major emerging), have been
revised downwards from the projections made in October
2012. The update brought out a downward revision of the
growth rate projections for the US and many countries in
the Euro area. In the emerging markets, India, Brazil,
Russia, and South Africa were the countries for which a
downward revision was made. The update also indicated
that the space for further policy easing had reduced, while
supply bottlenecks and policy uncertainty have hampered
growth in some economies, with a specific mention of Brazil
and India. An analysis of the growth rate of select major
emerging markets over the last decade shows that while
many countries recorded large negative rate in the GDP,
India and China continued to record positive growth over
the period (Table 2).
Twin deficits
The slowdown in the domestic economy and the un-
certainties in the global economy had an impact on key
macro variables in India. By February 2013, India was in the
midst of high twin deficits of GFD and CAD and despite
continuous efforts towards addressing the twin deficits the
situation persisted (Table 3). The global crisis had directly
impacted the fiscal situation in India. The sharp slowdown
in industrial production led to slowdown in overall GDP
growth affecting tax revenues e especially corporate in-
come tax e and the tight monetary policy since March 2010
dampened investment, subdued financial markets, and
hampered planned disinvestment by the government. The
rising prices of oil and fertilisers implied higher expenditure
in the form of higher subsidy by the central government.
The measures announced in September 2012 to raise the
price of oil and related products were expected to address
the issue of rising expenditure on subsidy. The GFD, though
high, has been on a declining trend but a sustainable fiscal
consolidation would require bringing current spending,
especially on subsidies, under control and protecting the
level of capital expenditure while also raising tax to GDP
ratios. The future course of strategy would generally be to
Table 3 Select Indicators: External sector.
Year Total
external
debt to GDP
Short term
debt to
total debt
CAD/GDP CR/CP DSR CR/GDP Import cover of
reserves (months)
1995e96 27.0 5.4 1.6 88.8 26.2 14.0 6.0
2005e06 16.8 14.0 1.2 94.8 10.1 24.0 11.6
2011e12 20.0 22.6 4.2 87.0 6.0 28.6 7.1
2012e13
End-Dec
20.6 24.4 5.4 na 5.8 na 7.3
CR e Current Receipts; CP e Current Payments; DSR e Debt Service Ratio; CAD e current account deficit); GDP e gross domestic
product.
Source: Reserve Bank of India and Government of India.
Growth cannot be taken for granted 243improve investment climate and investor sentiments
through sustained reforms to enhance growth.
The ratio of CAD to GDP reached a historically high level
of 5.4% during AprileDecember 2012, rising to an all-time
high of 6.7% in OctobereDecember 2012. The deteriorating
CAD was mainly attributed to continued large imports of
gold and oil, and in view of grim global markets, weak
growth in exports, leading to a deterioration of the trade
balance. This is a matter of concern, as in the past, the
highest recorded CAD of 3% was in 1990e91, which was
shortly followed by a major Balance of Payments crisis. In
recent months, capital flows were helpful in financing CAD
without a drawdown of foreign exchange reserves but
volatility in these flows could put pressure on the external
sector. Therefore, measures to lower CAD would need to be
considered.
The government and the RBI consider that several
measures announced in recent months are aimed at
restoring the fiscal health of the government and shrinking
the CAD as also improving the growth rate. With the global
economy also likely to recover somewhat in 2013, these
measures should help in improving the outlook of the In-
dian economy for 2013e14. Fiscal deficit would need to be
contained, especially by shrinking wasteful and distor-
tionary subsidies. On the expenditure side, the direct
benefit transfer scheme that will allow the transfer of
government benefits directly to targeted recipient bank
accounts can help reduce transactions costs, prevent
duplication, leakage, and fraud, and improve choices
for the poor. Translating a number of subsidies into
equivalent cash transfers could avoid price distortions and
could target subsidies better to the truly deserving. This
would help to enhance the efficiency of government
expenditure.
Some of the issues that have emerged in the economic
policy making, in the present context of financial crisis,
involve measures needed for recovery of the domestic and
global economy. (In these discussions, Dr. Virmani has made
significant contributions.) These issues are consistency in
reforms in the domestic and global economy as well as need
for reforms in international institutions. The reforms that
are undertaken need not yield higher growth in the imme-
diate future but could do so with some lag and follow a J-
curve pattern. Finally, the policy makers should not believe
that once an economy has recorded high growth, it will
remain on the same path due to inertia. Rather, measuresto ensure high growth would imply additional measures.
These issues are presented in the following discussion.
Global complacency
When the global financial crisis struck, the US economy and
world exports and industrial production crashed during the
second half of 2008, and the world stood at the brink of the
abyss of a second great depression. However, almost every
large economy undertook quick and effective fiscal and
monetary policy loosening, many in tandem at the behest
of the IMF. This led to limiting of the fallout and induced a
V or U shaped recovery in 2009e10, in terms of production
in the advanced countries and growth in the emerging
economies. This in turn induced a misplaced confidence in
the resilience of each economy among economists and
informed public opinion makers, and engendered a sense of
complacency in governments and political establishments
across the world (GOI, 2009). This resulted in the neglect of
basic economic reforms that were essential for restoring
economic growth to its full potential, both in countries
where the crisis originated and in emerging economies that
suffered collateral damage from this “great recession”
(Virmani, 2012a). With the underlying problems remaining
unresolved, persistent political gridlock in the US and the
Euro area countries further aggravated the financial crisis in
mid-2011. Since then, other financial crises have taken off
from the Euro area. This has created a high risk atmosphere
in economies across the world, including India where
growth continued its downward spiral (Virmani, 2011a).
Need for quota reforms
The recent financial crisis revealed that China and India
could withstand the crisis and maintain high growth while
the advanced countries were not only at the epicentre
but could not stage a recovery for nearly five years after
the crisis. Similarly, there are emerging markets such as
Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Africa which are per-
forming well. Therefore, much has changed in the world
economic situation since 2008, and China and India are
gradually emerging as potential superpowers. Accordingly,
it is essential that quota reforms are undertaken in the IMF
to reflect global reality. The IMF uses a quota formula to
guide the assessment of a member’s relative position that
244 C. Singhincludes gross domestic product (based on market exchange
rates and also on purchasing power parity), openness,
economic variability, and international reserves. Tradi-
tionally, these variables have been chosen to reflect the
multiple roles that the quota formula was designed to
address e vote share, resource contribution, and access to
loans (Cooper and Truman, 2007). Thus, the quota formula
determines both the quota contribution and the vote share
of the members of the IMF (except for the basic vote which
is assigned equally to all members). In a rapidly changing
global economy, a rational and reasonable quota formula
reform is fundamental to the credibility and legitimacy of
the IMF (Virmani, 2011b, 2011c). Unless the power balance
in the IMF changes to reflect the changes in economic
power in the world economy, the IMF will inevitably lose
credibility as an international institution (Virmani, 2012b).
This would reflect in the ability of the IMF to influence
important economic policy decisions in different countries.
This was reflected in the fact that during the Euro crisis, the
emerging markets could not influence some significant
policy decisions at the IMF (such as capital flows, stricter
regulation and supervision of financial institutions, and easy
monetary policy) and countries in the Euro areas. These
policy measures, after five years of prolonged crisis, are
now being reversed by the IMF.
There is a tectonic shift taking place and there is a very
high probability that in terms of global power, the world
will become bipolar by 2025 and tri polar by 2050 (Virmani,
2005b). China’s economy is likely to equal the US economy
in size by 2020 and to become about twice its size by 2050.
By then, India will be the second largest economy in Pur-
chasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, having overtaken the US
around 2040. The gap in “power potential” between China
and the US will be eliminated by 2040. Therefore, the IMF
should recognise the role of emerging markets in the global
economy and grant them more powers at the IMF.
J-curve hypothesis
A number of reforms were introduced in India in September
2012 but they did not make any visible impact on industrial
output and on general growth in the economy. This raised a
fundamental question as to whether there is a lagged effect
of reforms on growth. Earlier, a number of reforms were
introduced during the 80s and 90s in India. The country
achieved a considerably higher growth trajectory, due to
the limited economic reforms of the 1980s, though with a
lag. Later, India carried out deep and wide ranging liber-
alisation of domestic and external policies in the 1990s. The
economic reforms of the 1990s raised the growth potential
of the Indian economy and put it on a higher growth path
(Virmani, 2009). Yet, the growth rate in 1990s did not in-
crease significantly and immediately. An important ques-
tion that logically followed was how the limited reforms of
the 1980s could increase the growth rate by two percent
points, while the relatively major reforms of the 1990s had
virtually no effect on the growth trend. This issue was
discussed in detail by Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) who
argued that reforms in the 1990s were pro-market, not only
favouring the interests of existing businesses but also new
entrants and consumers and therefore took some time toget reflected. Singh (2005) discussed the political economy
aspect of the reforms in the 1990s. Helpman (2004) argued
that major inventions can trigger an uneven growth tra-
jectory which starts with a prolonged slowdown followed by
a fast deceleration. There could be many reasons for this
and Helpman and Rangel (1999) had argued that on-the-job
training that raises the productivity of workers also means
that technology specific skills are lost when a new tech-
nology replaces the earlier one. As per Virmani (2005a) and
Virmani and Hashim (2011), due to the enormity of the
change following economic reforms, the transition from the
old globally inefficient structure to a new more efficient
structure takes the J-curve shape in productivity and
output growth. The organised manufacturing sector in India
has also witnessed J-curve pattern of productivity growth in
the post reform period. Transformation of an economy from
low income to upper-middle income takes many decades. A
country is required to keep working towards facing changes
taking place and challenges from within and also outside
the country. Faster the growth, greater the change; with
such growth, the trade-offs are constantly changing, and
require a constant re-evaluation of the existing policies and
institutions. Ironically faster growth also brings along some
negative effects. As a country shifts from a low income
category to the lower-middle income category, institutional
adaptation and reforms also become essential.
Shooting stars or sprinters
There was a general belief held by some policy makers and
part of the media in India that once having achieved a
growth rate of an average of 9% or above, the economy
would never go down below 8%. The expectations of the
people and politicians in the country were also high and
there was pressure on the Planning Commission to factor a
growth of 10% or more in the next Five Year Plan. However,
there were some economists and policy makers in the
country who cautioned that growth inertia does not carry
too long and far, unless fundamental reforms are imple-
mented and the investment levels are maintained at a
higher level. Similarly, it appears that many people across
the world believe (a misconception) that achieving an
average growth rate of 9e10% over 10 years is a simple task.
Scores of countries have grown very fast, with GDP growth
rates of over 8.5% for a few years, but only a limited
number have sustained this average for a decade. To sus-
tain growth, a number of factors are important. Hsieh and
Klenow (2007) show that price of capital goods is an
important determinant of investment and rising prices of
capital goods could slowdown investment. Eichengreen,
Park, and Shin (2011), find that substantial impact on
growth can be ascribed to decline in contribution of total
factor productivity where investment, FDI, and policy
environment have a role to play. Virmani (2011d, 2012a,
2012c) terms this short term high growth which peters off
easily and sustained long-term growth as the phenomenon
of “shooting stars” and “sprinters”, respectively. Generally,
fast growth of a country in one decade is not a guarantee of
equal success in the following decade. The key to trans-
forming a low income economy to a middle income one is
sustained, fast economic growth. Sustained fast economic
Growth cannot be taken for granted 245growth can successfully result in a structural trans-
formation from a low income economy to a middle income
economy and from a middle income economy to a high in-
come economy. Many countries have experienced fast
growth (average of five years or more e shooting stars), but
very few countries have sustained fast growth for a period
of a decade or more (sprinters). Sustaining fast growth over
decades is a very challenging task. Also, policy reforms
required for sustaining fast growth are not necessarily the
same as those required for accelerating growth.Interview with Dr. A. Virmani
Prof Charan Singh (CS): To begin the interview, we would
like you to tell us something about the Indian economy. It
has been slowing down recently, in the last two or three
years. And we would like to know your views on the
remedial measures to arrest this decay and to reverse the
trend in the Indian economy.
Dr. Arvind Virmani (AV): Since 2011, if one looks at the
quarterly data, Indian industry and economy have been
showing a clear downtrend. In one sense it is not a surprise,
given that one was located in the global economy, and the
external situation was so bad. By the end of 2011 it was
quite clear that the economy would slow down unless
remedial measures were taken. The main policy measures
which have to be taken are fairly clear. The most important
is a correction of the macroeconomic management which
has resulted in one of the longest periods of sustained high
inflation, sustained rise in the current account deficit, fall
in the savings rate, the rise in gold (which has been noted)
and so on. All these indicators have simultaneously wors-
ened over the last three years. One of the key reasons for
this is macro policy and in particular the fiscal monetary
mix. What we need to do first and foremost is to dramati-
cally reduce the fiscal deficit and simultaneously loosen the
monetary policy. These elements, which I have pointed out
above are clearly indicative of various supply and demand
imbalances at different levels, from the micro to the macro
economy. So the first order of business right now is to
correct the fiscal trend, and the second is to focus on
reviving private investment which again has declined
dramatically over the last few years.
CS: Sir, as youhavebeen theChief Economic Advisor to the
Government of India, we would like your comments on the
following: Just before the budget, we have seen that the
prices of diesel, petrol, gas, have been delinked. We under-
stand that there is a problem with subsidies and the budget.
But do you think that this is the right way to do this? Would
such an adjustment not be inflationary for the country?
AV: The ideal situation in my view would be that
administered prices be totally freed up so that they have no
relationship with the budget at all. Unfortunately they have
come to be linked with the budget and it is useful to un-
derstand why this is so. Basically it is because prices are
controlled, and related to that is a subsidy which must be
paid to the oil companies, many of which are public sector
companies. So willy nilly the two get linked because sub-
sidies have to be provided for in the budget. The budget
makes a provision for subsidies on diesel, petrol, gas etc.
which is based on two factors. One is projection of theinternational price, and second is administered price de-
cisions of the Government to the extent these are
controlled by the petroleum ministry. Ideally, they should
not be so linked because if they were market linked then
they would rise when international prices rose and fall
when international prices fell and there would be no link to
the budget at all. That would be the ideal situation.
What I have long suggested and fortunately what is
beginning to come into play now is the following: What
really hurts the middle class and particularly those with
relatively fixed levels of income are the sharp changes
which result when you hold off on price increases for
months and years and then increase them sharply. So if you
could let them loose and maybe prescribe a maximum limit,
maybe maximum of one rupee per month or two rupees,
then people would not even notice that the prices were
changing.
CS: How about the inflationary impact of petrol, diesel,
gas prices? Any special study done and any predictions?
AV: That’s a good question because everybody assumes
that it is a cost push world and whenever you raise diesel
prices, inflation will rise. But I have often tried to explain to
the public when I was the CEA, that a rise in price is not
inflation, it is a one-time change. It becomes inflation when
the rate of increase of prices increases. So yes, the perceived
inflation or the rate which is announced goes up, and then
you have a one-time increase in price of diesel, gas, and
petrol. But it does not affect the inflation that is, or should
really be, the target ofmonetary policy. Now of course this is
very easy to say but harder to do when the public starts
clamouring, because prices do go up faster for a while;
however, it is still important. But the way to look at it in the
Indian situation is you have a trade-off. You can either have
an explicit increase in prices or you raise the fiscal deficit and
that feeds through the whole economy and has an infla-
tionary impact on the whole economy, not just on the rela-
tive price of diesel or petrol or LPG. So my understanding of
the research is that at worst, this effect over a reasonable
period of time is neutral and optimistically it has a positive
effect because a fiscal deficit affects the whole inflationary
environment as against the diesel price which affects the
particular price of those sets of goods. So in a reasonable
time period, let us say over a period of 9e12 months, it may
actually reduce the rate of inflation. Of course the initial
impact is a rise in prices, there is no doubt about that.
CS: That is a good point and I think the market does not
understand that the rise is a one-time occurrence; it does
not impact inflation and the link through gross fiscal deficit.
We have been reading your research and you have
mentioned savings and investment rates. How do we raise
the savings and investment rates? They have both suffered
in the recent past. And how do you think we should deal
with the widening current account deficit?
AV: When I analysed the balance of payments crisis of
1991, some simple research showed that every 1% rise in
the current account deficit of the Central Government
resulted in roughly 0.5% rise in the current account deficit.
Now I do not know what the exact numbers are currently
because that was 20 years ago, but I would not be surprised
if one got similar sort of results today.
The second point is that the decline in savings rate is
unprecedented. Historically we have never had such a
2 In economics, hysteresis arises when a single disturbance affects
the future course of the economy. An example of hysteresis would
be the long-term effect of unemployment. Hysteresis results
because unemployed resources are permanently changed, through
loss of skills, determination or seniority. The result is a permanent
increase in structural and frictional unemployment and a higher
natural unemployment rate.
246 C. Singhreversal because whenever the economy slowed down, the
savings rates used to go back up. This is the first time that
a slowdown has resulted in such a sharp decline in the
savings rate. Not that the savings rate did not go down, it
used to slow down and then recover very quickly. Because
when the economy slows down, the consumption con-
tinues and therefore the savings fall temporarily but the
adjustment used to be reasonably quick. This is the first
time when the savings rate has been lower than its peak
for such a length of time despite a growth rate that is
higher than 5%. The decline in the savings rate is firstly
due to the direct effect of the rise in fiscal deficit (this is
the national saving rate which includes both private and
Government). Secondly, it is the effect of the combination
of the fiscal and monetary policy. With monetary policy
tight, despite a rising inflation, you get a shift in the
savings from financial savings to gold and other such
commodities. And therefore you get the simultaneous ef-
fect of a falling savings rate, higher inflation, and current
account deficit.
As far as investment rate is concerned, it is a different
issue. The first part is cyclical, which we talked about, and I
think that can be corrected by the macro policy. But the
investment rate is linked to more long-term aspects such as
policy and regulatory reforms. In very simple terms, the
shock to the economy from the global system was not
adequately addressed by accelerating the rate of reforms.
In contrast, the rate of reforms went down. What we got
was the illusion of high growth for two years when we
pumped up the economy which may have caused us to get
complacent and then the investment rate collapsed
because that was not sustainable. Now, pumping up the
economy was quite valid and correct for 2008e09 because
you had an international fall in demand and you had a
squeeze on liquidity in monetary terms. So you had to in-
crease both the fiscal deficit and the money supply. But the
fiscal deficit should have started winding down in 2009e10,
which did not happen. On the contrary, in 2010e11, you
had this huge pump priming, which was not sustainable.
So what do we need to do for investment? There is a
whole host of policy reforms which need to be implemented
gradually. Everything does not have to be done instanta-
neously. The Government made a beginning in the October
to December 2012 quarter. But in my view, more needs to
be done if we want a quick return of the growth rate to the
8% level, which I believe is the underlying sustainable rate
of growth.
CS: Inflation, you just mentioned, has been sustaining
for a very long time. And it has been very high for the last
three years. It influences all the policy areas. What would
be your advice to policy makers and to the general public
on inflation?
AV: We have already talked about the fiscal, so I will not
repeat that. But besides that, one needs to look at the
individual sources of inflation and at the sectoral supply-
demand balances. The analysis reveals two major issues.
The preliminary analysis that I have done of the recent
period relates to i) agriculture and ii) the energy sector.
With regard to agriculture, the relative price of agricultural
goods e inflation has been high and we need to try and
address those issues. A beginning has been made through
FDI reform; the supply chain needs to be modernised. It isancient and inadequate to the faster growth and bigger
demands from the urban areas.
Second is the energy sector where you have a combi-
nation of things. One is the pricing, because the price has
become distorted. It is not just a question of subsidy
because you can delink subsidy from prices and you must do
that. The prices must reflect the opportunity cost which is
why you get the imbalance. You need to bring down rate of
growth of demand, by freeing prices. If you need to give
subsidy it has to be done in a different way rather than by
holding prices. There are certain other problems associated
with energy. For instance, we finally managed to get a lot of
investment into power, which has been a problem for ages,
but then we have a monopoly coal producer. It is a Gov-
ernment monopoly. Though we have all this capacity there
is no coal to run these power plants, which are just lying
idle. So there are number of policy reforms needed in the
energy sector. One of the simplest would be to de-
nationalise the coal industry, if not formally through the
legal system, then by allowing more entry. For example,
you could break up Coal India into the four coal companies
which you used to have earlier and allow them to compete.
You could allow private sector companies to set up coal
mining companies. The cleanest way would be to change
the Coal Nationalisation Act. But you can do a lot without
doing that.
CS: Sir, you seem to have done lots of work on J-curve on
productivity and growth. And in the recent months Gov-
ernment of India has introduced a number of reforms.
Given the J-curve analysis, how do you expect the growth in
the economy to take off now?
AV: Interesting question. The point about the J-curve
was the difference between marginal reforms and major
reforms. The argument of the J-curve was, when you have
very large reforms, they lead to a change in the structure of
the economy. And to change the structure of economy, it
takes time and it requires extra effort. For example when
you liberalise or reduce tariffs and quantitative restrictions
(QRs), some sectors suddenly become uncompetitive and
others become competitive. Therefore you could get a fall
in the measure of productivity. It will take a little time
before you see the benefits of competition and productivity
increase. This is what happened in the early 1990s and
through the 90s.
In the current situation, we are talking about the case
where reforms came to a halt or became very slow. So the
question is to revive the reforms. While it is not directly
relevant to the current situation, we do get a related or
opposite phenomenon of hysteresis2 because in some
sense there was a lag in addressing the real problems. If
the same reforms had been carried out two years ago
(let’s say), the economy would have revived much faster.
But given that for two years we did not do certain things,
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curve, and this means that the recovery will be a little
slow or you have to make a bigger effort to get it back on
track. I expect that it will take at least six months for us to
see the impact of the reforms carried out at the end of
last year and hopefully in this budget. But the economy
will not suddenly go back to 8% growth. For that to
happen, we will need many more reforms and it will take
probably another year.
CS: We now want to talk to you about the international
scenario, specifically the FDI flows to India. Comparatively
they are reasonably lower than FDI flows to other countries.
And this, despite the fact that India is a democratic country
and has been generally doing well. What would be the
reasons? How do we improve the FDI flows to India?
AV: That is a good question. There are two broad rea-
sons. One, a positive reason, is that in some senses Indian
entrepreneurship, particularly Indian dynastic entrepre-
neurship is very strong. In one of my earlier papers, I
labelled India’s growth since 2004 as “Entrepreneur Led
Growth”. I had pointed out that the problem holding India
back was poor governance. The Government was actually a
drag on the economy and because of the good dynastic
entrepreneurship we were able to overcome that drag. Now
what that means is, in some sense, there is less of an op-
portunity or scope for FDI. That is a positive.
But on the negative side is a huge problem, which is the
attitude of the bureaucracy and of our systems, including
our political system resulting from what I call the heritage
of the East India Company. We still have a suspicious atti-
tude towards companies and the private sector when most
of the world, the part which is doing well and which at-
tracts a lot of FDI, has a positive attitude. They look at
investment as a generator of jobs and income. Unfortu-
nately our bureaucracy has not been trained to think like
that. It is beginning to change, it has changed among the
young, but I do not think it has changed as a system. These
indices of governance, of corruption, of whatever you want
to call it, affect both domestic investment and FDI. But
because the foreigners are not used to dealing with this
type of governance or corruption, while (to some extent)
our domestic entrepreneurs have got used to it, this con-
strains FDI. If we want to grow faster, we have to address
this issue.
We have tried to address this problem several times
before, but not successfully. The basic attitude towards
those who create jobs and income has to change. For
example (perhaps it is a dream), if you could incentivise
bureaucrats and Government servants, to be rewarded on
the basis of the number of jobs they maintain or create, in
whichever area they are running, that could transform the
whole picture, both in the economy and with respect to
investment.
CS: China has been doing so very well in the last two
decades or more. Also, China has been strategically gaining
on all fronts. They have very good relationships with their
neighbours, they are taking very strong steps in far off
countries, as well as international institutions, and they
have established themselves in a big way. Would you like to
comment on India’s foreign policy and diplomacy and any
learning that Indians need to do from China’s diplomatic
strategy?AV: It is an extremely good, but complicated question.
So let me just give a few observations. We must remember
that China’s GDP is now about two to two and half times
ours, in real terms. So they have more money. Secondly
because theirs is a Communist party led government, they
are less subjected to short-term pulls and pressures than a
democracy like India is. What does that mean? Well, we
have so many different interests that we are unable to
define or constrained in defining a simple, straightforward,
clear policy with respect to the external world. Despite
that we have managed to do some things. The difference
really is that China is very clear about its objectives. They
have a small number of very clear objectives. And the
whole system works towards achieving those objectives.
Once they (the party leadership) decide that an issue is of
interest to them, they use all their resources and they focus
everything on that.
So what is the lesson for India? I think the lesson is that
one, we have to have a little more clarity on our external
objectives. Second, we must co-ordinate across de-
partments which deal with the outside world. Often that
common understanding is not there, to the same extent as
it is in every country which is successful diplomatically. And
third, sometimes one needs more resources. There does not
seem to be enough interest in India to do the academic
work or the background work which one finds most suc-
cessful countries have done. They have a number of options
generated by think tanks. We lack that. So these are the
three simple things I would point out.
CS: Sir, there has been a slowdown globally and China’s
economy is still maintaining some growth, though slowly.
What are your views on the impact of China’s growth trend
on the Indian economy?
AV: Since around 2000, I have been forecasting a
gradual slowdown in the Chinese economy. If you look at
their rate of growth relative to the world, it has actually
been on a declining trend. I think that will continue. And
the reason is very simple. It is what we call catch up
growth; we know from history that growth always slows
down as the per capita income rises and though China has
been able to beat the odds over two or three decades, at
some point, this will not continue. So China’s economy is
slowing down and I had earlier forecast that it would slow
down below India’s by around the middle of this decade.
Unfortunately India’s economy has slowed down even more
in the past year or so, so my forecast is in doubt right now.
But I am hopeful; if India does what it has started to do in
the last six months, and follows through and does not give
up, we could still get back to our kind of rising trend
relative to China.
As far as the second part of your question is concerned, I
do not think there is a direct link between China’s growth
trend and the Indian economy. China is really an export
oriented economy and the only countries that benefitted
from China (this is not conventional wisdom, it is my view)
are the resource exporting countries. As we are not a major
resource exporter, there is no clear direct link between
China’s growth and the Indian economy.
CS: The next question is on external shocks. In view of
the global meltdown and repercussions, according to you,
what should be the focus areas of reform initiatives to
shield India from external shocks?
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stepped up our reforms two years ago, we would have been
shielded from the slowdown. Unfortunately because that
was not done the slowdown has affected us. We need to
reaccelerate the reforms in various sectors. One specific
factor is that the net asset position of India abroad has
deteriorated during this process. We have already dis-
cussed one aspect of this e the current account deficit.
What that means is that our net debt position globally as a
country has worsened over the last two to three years.
Since the problem has accumulated, it will take a longer
time to solve and that is unfortunate. However, in many of
the developed countries fiscal deficit has worsened even
more. So relative to them perhaps the danger is not so
much. That gives us a little hope and a small window to
solve it. But if these problems go unaddressed along the
lines we have indicated earlier, then there could be a real
problem. But I am very hopeful that measures will be taken
to address the problems.
CS: Sir, there has been some news that BRIC nations
could be using local currencies or local currency could be
considered for trade in BRIC countries. What do you think
about this?
AV: Well I think it is more of a political statement, more
to do with the trust between whichever countries are
involved. Given our current power position in the global
institutions, at least three of us, India, Russia, and Brazil
are not in a position to independently exercise great in-
fluence. So acting jointly with Brazil and Russia helps us to
raise our profile internationally. And of course if China joins
to form a solid BRIC, which it does occasionally, that helps
even more. So I would say this is more a political statement
than an economic statement.
CS: Sir, you have been the Executive Director at IMF.
Could you guide us or tell us how India can improve its
quota and say in the IMF?
AV: What we have done in the last two to three years in
the IMF (as ED) is to say that the basic quota formula which
determines the quota share and the vote and say in the IMF, is
flawed. And that we need to reform it. We have given many
suggestions which have proved convincing and probably so
strong that people opposed to these changes are falling back
on politics to counter them. So the battle or debate has
shifted from real economic issues to the basic political issue
that those who are in power do not want to give it up. So it
will have to be fought at some political level now.
CS: Finally there was a proposal of the Asian Monetary
Fund. What would you think of this proposal?
AV: It is called the “Chiang Mai initiative”, but it is
exclusive. It is based on what people call ASEAN plus three.
The ASEAN countries, plus China, Japan, and South Korea. It
is a system that is exclusive or exclusionary because it does
not include all Asian countries. It certainly does not include
India. And in my view, that is not a good way to develop
Asian institutions. As of now I do not see any move or effortto develop it into an inclusionary system like the Asian
Monetary Fund where by definition if it is Asian, all Asian
countries should have the right to be members. I do not
think that is a very immediate or even medium term
possibility.
CS: Sir, thank you so much for your time. It has been very
illuminating for us to listen to your opinion on various as-
pects of the domestic economy as well as international
evolvements.References
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